







What does your medical expenditure do to your health? Researchers often get sig-
ni¯cant negative sign on the relative coe±cient in the reduced form health production
regression. The puzzling result motivates this simple dynamic quantitative general
equilibrium model to study the relationships between health status, medical expendi-
ture and employment. The structural parameters are estimated by an indirect inference
procedure. This paper ¯nds that the simulated coe±cient of medical expenditure in
the health equation is negative even though in the health evolution equation of the
structural model, medical expenditure only impacts the health in the positive way.
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errors remain with author.1 Introduction
As we all know, medical expenditure in U.S. now is almost 15 percent of its total GDP.1
Hence, in order to e®ectively control the skyrocketing cost and at the same time, improve
individuals' qualities of life, it is very important for researchers and policy makers to un-
derstand the role of medical expenditure in individuals' lives. What does your medical
expenditure do to your health? People would respond very naturally that of course it will do
good to health or there is just no point of spending any money on medical care. However,
researchers often get signi¯cant negative sign on the relative coe±cient in the reduced form
health production regression. Before we can explain the medical expenditure puzzle, let us
do some literature review.
Medical expenditure has been suggested to be viewed as one form of human capital
decades ago (Mushkin 1962, pp. 129-49; Becker 1964, pp. 33-36; Fuchs 1966, pp. 90-91).2
Grossman (1972) is the ¯rst to construct a life cycle model of the demand for health capital
itself. In his model, health is viewed as a capital stock which yields an output of \healthy
days". Individuals may invest in health by combining time (e.g., for doctor's visits) with
purchased inputs(e.g., medical services). The incentive for investing in health is that by
increasing the health stock the individual increases the amount of time available for earning
income or for producing consumption goods. This approach has enabled him to derive some
propositions about the pattern of medical expenditures over an individual's lifetime and to
describe the behavior of health capital over the life cycle. Cropper (1977) adds in a few
new features into the previous life cycle model such as the randomness of illness and the
disutility associated with illness and derives some propositions about the pattern of medical
expenditures over an individual's lifetime. However, neither of there papers has a speci¯c
1Source: CMS, O±ce of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group.
2Quoted from Grossman 1972.
1utility function. Their papers concentrate only on some analytical works.
Grossman (1972b) then runs a reduced form regression on health production function and
¯nds that the coe±cient on medical expenditure is signi¯cant negative which contradicts the
expectation from his previous paper. He explains this is a result of the correlation between the
medical expenditure and the error term (health depreciation rate). The correlation causes a
downward bias and hence, the coe±cient could be negative. In order to correct the wrong sign
on medical expenditure, a lot of labor and health economists have devoted enormous amount
of e®orts to ¯nd the right data set and right instruments to a certain group of individuals.
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983, 1988, 1991) and Grossman and Joyce(1990) consider the
e®ects of some health inputs such as mother's prenatal care and smoking behavior on baby's
health. They use baby's weight as a measure of baby's health and use income, education
and price of medical care service as instruments for medical care. They get the consistent
estimates though the validity of baby's weight as an instrument for baby's health has been
questioned.
Instead of spending all the e®orts on searching for the good instruments and trying to
correct the sign as the most researchers do, this paper studies individuals' choices of medical
expenditure and how their medical expenditures a®ect their health and in turn their job
opportunities and qualities of life. This paper reviews the impacts and causalities between
health status, medical expenditure and employment in a simple dynamic quantitative general
equilibrium model. The structural parameters in the model are estimated by matching
the model's implications with individual observations from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) as part of a minimum distance estimation routine.
With the estimated structural parameters, a panel data set is simulated. The paper
¯nds that the simulated coe±cient of medical expenditure in the health equation is negative
even though in the health evolution equation of the structural model, medical expenditure
only impacts the health in the positive way. This study shows that measurement without
2theory, without taking into consideration of people's preference, behavior, market structure
and government policy, is just not that informative (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000).
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical model. Section 3
describes the data and model parameterization strategy. Section 4 presents the estimation
results. Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses the future work.
2 The Theoretical Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
This paper considers a dynamic quantitative model with heterogeneous agents. The economy
is populated by a large number of individuals who are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to
their health status. The agents in this economy are in¯nite-lived and maximize the following






where ct is consumption, ht is health stock, ¯ is the discount factor and 0 < ¯ < 1, U(¢;¢) is
the momentary utility function.
In this simple model, agents can't save. Their budget constraint is given by
ct = y
d
t ¡ mt (2)
where ct is the consumption in the current period, yd
t is the disposable income in the current
period and mt is the medical care expenditure in the current period (which includes all
expenditures that may a®ect an agent's health status, such as time and money spent on
health clubs, appropriate nutrition, medical insurance, and other expenses related to health
care.)
Agents' health stocks evolve according to the following equation:
ht+1 = Át(1 ¡ ±)ht + am
b
t (3)
3where ht is the health stock at the beginning of the current period, ± is the health depreciation
rate, Át is the health shock at the beginning of the current period, mt is the medical care
expenditure in the current period, a and b are parameters and ht+1 is the health stock at
the beginning of the next period.
In each period of their lives, agents face a stochastic employment opportunity. Let s
denote the employment state of an individual. If s = e, the agent is employed and if s = u,
the agent is unemployed. Conditional on agents' employment status last period and health
stock at the beginning of this period, the employment probabilities in this period are denoted
by ¼(e0je;h0), ¼(u0je;h0), ¼(u0ju;h0) and ¼(e0ju;h0). They are estimated by Nadaraya Watson
Nonparametric Regression from the MEPS data.
Figure 1 shows the employment probabilities this period conditional on whether the
individual is employed (top) or unemployed (bottom) last period and their health status.
The vertical axis is the estimated employment probabilities and the horizontal axis is the
actual health stock divided by 100. The lowest health level is 11.73 and the highest level is
67.24 in the MEPS data (see Table 2).
The probabilities are continuous in h0. From the graphs, we can see that everything else
being equal, the healthier agent has a higher chance of getting the job and the agent who
had a job last period has a better chance of being employed this period.
If the agent is employed, his disposable income is y ¡ ¿, where y is his income and ¿
is the income tax he has to pay. If the agent is unemployed, his disposable income is just
his unemployment insurance from the government µy, where µ is the replacement ratio of
unemployment insurance.
Agents face an i.i.d. stochastic health shock in each period. Let Á 2 © = fÁg;Ábg3 denote
the health shock state.
Let ´ denotes the employment status of the agent. If the agent is employed, ´ = 1,
3Ág is good shock, i.e. new health technology being invented and Áb is bad shock, i.e. car accident or
broken leg. Ág > 1 and Áb 2 [0;1).



























































































Figure 1: The employment transition probabilities for employed and unemployed individuals
5otherwise ´ = 1.
The timing of the model is the following: The agent enters period t with a health stock
of ht, then his employment probability can be calculated and he gets a health shock Át. His
health depreciates at a rate of ± and he makes his investment on medical care mt to maintain
his health. Then he enters period t+1 with a health stock of ht+1 which evolves according
to equation (3).
The maximization problem can be written as a dynamic programming problem. Note
that the state variable are health stock h, employment opportunity s and health shock Á.
The dynamic programming problem is:
V (Á;e;h) = max
m













V (Á;u;h) = max
m














m ¸ 0 (4)
De¯nition: The stationary equilibrium for this economy is the set of decisions rules
c(Á;s;h), m(Á;s;h), a time-invariant measure ¸(Á;s;h) of individuals at state (Á;s;h) and
a tax rate ¿ such that:
1. Given the tax rate ¿, individuals solve the maximization problem in (4).







3. Government ¯nances UI bene¯ts by taxing income. So, the total amount of UI bene¯ts





¸(Á;s;h)[1 ¡ ´(Á;s;h)]µy(Á;s;h) (6)

























where ­(Á;s;h) = f(Á;s;h) : h0 = h0(Á;s;h)g.
2.2 Properties of Utility Function, Value Function and Decision
Rules
For utility function, this paper assumes u(¢;¢) is twice di®erentiable and continuous, uc > 0,
uh > 0, ucc < 0, uhh < 0, u(0;¢) = 1, u(¢;0) = 1, u(1;¢) = 0 and u(¢;1) = 0. Based
on these properties of the utility function, certain properties for value function and decision
rules could be analyzed. A two period version of this model is used to do the analysis in
order to simplify the problem.
The value function in period 1 is de¯ned by




c1(Á1;s1;h1) = s1y ¡ m1(Á1;s1;h1) (8)
Proposition 1 In a two period version of this model, it is optimal for the agents to invest
nothing on their medical care in period 1. V1 is continuous, increasing and concave in both
s1 and h1. Á1 doesn't a®ect V1.
Proof:
1. Take the ¯rst order condition of V1 with respect to m1. This gives us ¡uc · 0, m1 ¸ 0




@s1 = ucy > 0 and
@2V1
@s2
1 = uccy2 < 0.
3.
@V1
@h1 = uh > 0 and
@2V1
@h2
1 = uhh < 0.
4. Á1 a®ects V1 through m1. m¤
1 = 0 implies Á1 doesn't a®ect V1.
The value function in period 0 is de¯ned by










c0(Á0;s0;h0) = s0y ¡ m0(Á0;s0;h0)
h1 = (1 ¡ ±)h0Á0 + am0(Á0;s0;h0)
b (9)
Proposition 2 In period 0, the medical care investment is not monotone in either health
stock or employment state. Its value could be increasing or decreasing depending on the
starting health stock and certain parameter values. However, V0 is continuous and increasing
in s0, Á0 and h0.
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix 2.
3 Parameterizations
3.1 Approach
The structural model parameters are estimated using the method of indirect inference. For
arbitrary values of the vector of parameters £, the dynamic programming problem is solved
and policy functions are generated. Using these policy functions, the decision rule is simu-
lated, given arbitrary initial conditions, to create a simulated version of the data to match.
One then chooses a descriptive statistical model that provides a rich description of the pat-
terns of covariation in the data. Such a descriptive model can be estimated on both the
simulated data from the structural model, and on the actual observed data. This then gives
us two sets of coe±cients to match, ªs(£) and ªd.
8The estimate ^ £ is pinned down by minimizing the weighted distance between the actual









where W is a weighting matrix. The method of indirect inference will generate a consistent
estimate of µ. The weighting matrix,W, is based on the variances of the coe±cients estimated
from the MEPS.4 Assuming that the covariance between coe±cients is zero, the weighting
matrix is constructed as the inverse of a matrix in which the variances of the coe±cients are
on the diagonal and all o®-diagonal elements are zero.
Since the ªs(£) function is not analytically tractable, the minimization is performed
using numerical techniques. A simulated annealing algorithm is used to perform the op-
timization in order to obtain the global minimum in parameter space no matter what the
starting values are.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Model
3.2.1 Data
The data used for this paper come from the Household Component of the Medical Expendi-
ture Panel Survey. The MEPS HC is a nationally representative survey of the U.S. civilian
noninstitutionalized population, collects medical expenditure data at both the person and
household levels. The HC collects detailed data on demographic characteristics, health con-
ditions, health status, use of medical care services, charges and payments, access to care,
satisfaction with care, health insurance coverage, income, and employment. The HC uses an
overlapping panel design in which data are collected through a preliminary contact followed
by a series of ¯ve rounds of interviews over a -year period. Using computer-assisted personal
interviewing (CAPI) technology, data on medical expenditures and use for two calendar
years are collected from each household. This series of data collection rounds is launched
4The respective variances of the ¯ve MEPS coe±cients displayed in Section 3.2.2 are (0.00016865,
0.0022495, 0.010501, 0.000015119, 0.00016078).
9each subsequent year on a new sample of households to provide overlapping panels of survey
data and, when combined with other ongoing panels, will provide continuous and current
estimates of health care expenditures. MEPS HC panel 6 covers two years' data (2001 and
2002) for 21,959 individuals. Since this paper's main goal is to explore the relationships for
the working age individuals, the sample of individuals whose ages are either below 18 or over
65 is dropped. Students are out of sample too. After cleaning the sample with the missing
information, 8896 data points are left.
3.2.2 Descriptive Model
The descriptive model consists two linear equations which are extensively estimated in the
literature of health economics.5 These equations are health equation and medical expenditure
equation. They take the following forms:
ht+1 = ®1mt + ®2ht + ®3htmt + X1®4 + "1
mt = °1ht + °2st + X2°3 + "3 (11)
where h is individual's health, s is individual's employment status and m is individual's
out-of-pocket medical expenditure.6 X1 and X2 are control variables in these equations.
Since these control variables are not modeled in the structural model, it is assumed that the
agents in the structural model are homogenous in them. The MEPS coe±cients ªd, which
are going be matched by the simulated coe±cients ªs(£), are f®1 ®2 ®3 °1 °2g. Please refer
Table 1 and Table 2 for the de¯nitions and the summary statistics of all the variables in
these equations.
In the health equation, medical expenditure is expected to have a positive e®ect on health
but the coe±cient by OLS regression is usually negative. Researchers try to reverse the sign
5Currie and Madrian (1999) has a detailed review of them. Stratmann (1999) estimates the e®ect of
doctor visits on work day loss using the types of health insurance as instruments for doctor visits.
6Here, I use out-of-pocket medical expenditure to match the structural model medical expenditure since
in the structural model, there are no any forms of medical subsidies.
10by using di®erent kinds of instruments. Last period health is expected to have a positive
e®ect on this period health.
In the medical expenditure equation, conditional on the same employed status, healthier
individuals are expected to spend less on their medical bill and therefore, the coe±cients is
expected to be negative. Conditional on the same health level, the employed individuals are
expected to spend more on their medical care and therefore the coe±cient is expected to be
positive but in most studies, the coe±cient is signi¯cantly negative.
The coe±cients on the control variables in the two equations are exogenous to the re-
spective equation. They all have their expected signs.
These two equations are estimated separately by OLS regression. The results are reported
in Table 3. According to the OLS results,
ª
d = f¡:031616 0:545791 0:045417 ¡ 1:48747 ¡ :060408g:7
7In the actual computation, in order for the two sets of coe±cients match each other, the variables must be
level free. As a result, we use the share of medical expenditure to income instead of the medical expenditure
itself in the computation regression. Please refer to Appendix 2 for the regression results. The MEPS
coe±cients used in the compution are ªd = f¡:29389 0:556889 0:392657 ¡ :11865 ¡ :052437g. In order
to use the medical expenditure share, the individuals without any income or with the medical expenditure
share greater than 1 are out of sample. This leaves us with 8168 data points. The expenditure regression
and the share regression uses the same sample.
11Table 1. Variable de¯nitions:
Dependent variables
healtht physical component summary index at the end of period t,
0 is the lowest heath level, 100 is the highest
medicalt total amount of out-of-pocket medical expenditure
Independent Variables appearing in all the equations
age Individual's actual age
sex 1 if male, 0 otherwise
race 1 if white, 0 otherwise
mar 1 if married, 0 otherwise
edu 1 if with a college degree, 0 otherwise
Additional independent variables appearing in the health equation
smoke 1 if smoke, 0 otherwise
phyact 1 if currently spends half hour or more on moderate to vigorous
physical activities at least three times a week, 0 otherwise
healtht¡1 physical component summary index at the end of period t-1,
0 is the lowest heath level, 100 is the highest
Additional independent variables appearing in the medical expenditure equation
employedt employment status at period t: 1 if in labor force, 0 otherwise
inscov whether the individual has health insurance coverage: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
spousein spouse' actual income: if no spouse then spousein=0
12Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample:
Variables in the Model Sample Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
healtht 50.07 9.39 11.73 67.24
medicalt 507 1130 0 37128
Independent Variables appearing in all the equations
age 42.27 11.95 19 65
sex 0.46 0.50 0 1
race 0.81 0.39 0 1
mar 0.63 0.48 0 1
edu 0.23 0.42 0 1
Additional independent variables appearing in the health equation
smoke 0.23 0.42 0 1
phyact 0.55 0.50 0 1
healtht¡1 50.11 9.41 13.21 67.13
Additional independent variables appearing in the medical expenditure equation
employedt 0.76 0.43 0 1
inscov 0.84 0.37 0 1
spousein 20372 28647 0 280777
13Table 3. Estimation results of OLS estimation:














*the coe±cient is not signi¯cant at 5 percent signi¯cant level.
Table 3. Estimation results of OLS estimation(Continued):













No of observations 8168**
**See footnote 8.
143.3 Parameters in the Structural Model





0 · ¾ < 1 and ½ > 0 guarantee that uc > 0, uh > 0, ucc < 0 and uhh < 0 but the sign
of uch depends on whether ½ is greater or less than 1.
² The time period in the model is one year. The health stock is set between 0 and 1
to match the data. The output is normalize to 1. ¯ is set to 0.95. ± is the health
depreciation rate in the health evolution equation. ± is set to 0.01 based on the fact
that human beings can easily live up to 100 years if without any accident or illness.
² This paper takes policy parameters µ and ¿ as exogenous. µ is set to 0.25 which the
U.I. replacement ratio in the United States and ¿ is set to 0.15 which is the average
tax rate in the United States.8
² The parameters need to be estimated by Indirect Inference are £ = f¾ ½ a b zg. ¾
and ½ are preference parameters. a and b are parameters in the health stock evolution
equation. z is the health shock parameter. Even though the result of indirect inference
doesn't depend on the initial values of the parameters, this paper still search for the
most reasonable values possible for the starting values to reduce the computation time.
{ ¾ is set to 0.15 arbitrarily and degree of risk aversion ½ is set to 2.5 following
Mehra and Prescott(1985).
{ a is set to 0.5 from the coe±cient on medical expenditure in health equation of
the descriptive model and b is set to 0.99 arbitrarily.
{ In this paper, Ág = 1 + z, Ág = 1 ¡ z and z is set to 0.2 arbitrarily.
8In the actual computation, I use only partial equilibrium instead of the general equilibrium in the model.
154 Results
4.1 Estimation Results
The estimation procedure described in the previous section gives us the following results of
the structural parameters and the simulated coe±cients:
Table 6a. Structural Parameter Estimates:
¾ ½ a b z¤
Initial V alue 0.15 2.5 0.5 1 0.2
Estimated V alue 0.1416 3.5346 0.789 0.7944 0.201
*¾ 2 [0;1], ½ > 0, a 2 [0;1], b > 0, z 2 [0;1].
Table 6b. Data and Simulated Coe±cients:
®1 ®2 ®3 °1 °2 $(£)
MEPS -.29389 0.556889 0.392657 -.11865 -.052437
Simulated -.30829 0.53033 0.33786 -.24121 -.07161 122
From Table 6b, we can see that the simulated coe±cients match the MEPS coe±cients
quite well. Interestingly, the simulated ®1, the coe±cient of medical expenditure in the
health equation, is negative even though in the health evolution equation of the structural
model, medical expenditure only impacts the health in the positive way because parameters
a and b are both positive. This is probably caused by the endogeneity problem in the reduced
form health production function regression. Something in the error term might be correlated
with the medical expenditure in the reduced form health production function such as health
depreciation rate or individuals' initial health level. The fact re°ects that reduced form
regression results sometimes give us the wrong information without knowing the structural
model behind it because of some correlation issues.
From a statistical perspective, the model is rejected since the reported value of $(£) is
still high compare to the cut o® value. However, in this setting, this re°ects the fact that
16the coe±cients are calculated from a very large panel data set, implying very small standard
deviations of the coe±cients (and a very large W). Given how precisely the micro coe±cients
are estimated from the actual data, virtually any model would be formally rejected with even
very modest deviations of the simulated coe±cients from the actual coe±cients. As we have
emphasized above, the ¯t of the model in the last line of Table 6b is actually quite good in
terms of matching the data coe±cients on both a qualitative and quantitative basis.
5 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the \medical expenditure puzzle". Instead of trying to correct the
wrong sign in the reduced form health production function, this paper studies individuals'
choices of medical expenditure and how their medical expenditures a®ect their health and
in turn their job opportunities and qualities of life in a dynamic general equilibrium model.
Through this study, we can see clearly how the medical expenditure impacts individuals'
health and what factors determine how much the individuals are going to spend on their
medical care.
The structural parameters are estimated by the method of Indirect Inference which min-
imizes the distance function of the MEPS coe±cients and the simulated coe±cients. The
simulated coe±cient of medical expenditure in the health equation is negative even though in
the health evolution equation of the structural model, medical expenditure only impacts the
health in the positive way. The fact re°ects that reduced form regression results sometimes
give us the wrong information without knowing the structural model behind it.
This paper concentrates on understanding the role of medical expenditure in individuals'
lives. There are not many government policies included in the model other than the tax and
unemployment insurance. But with the estimated structural parameters, it will be easy to
accommodate the health insurance and social insurance policies into the model. This model
provides room for government policies.
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19Appendix 1
The value function in period 0:
V0(Á0;s0;h0) = max
m0











u(s0y ¡ m0;h0) + ¯
X
Á1
Â(Á1jÁ0)f¼(ejs0;h1)u(y(1 ¡ ¿);(1 ¡ ±)h0Á0 + am
b
0)
+¼(ujs0;h1)u(yµ;(1 ¡ ±)h0Á0 + am
b
0)g
1. Take the ¯rst order condition of V0 with respect m0, and let x = ®1h1 + ®2s0 + ®3.
This gives us the implicit function of the endogenous variables h0, m0 and s0.























(1 + ex)2[u(y(1 ¡ ¿);h1) ¡ u(yµ;h1)]
+¼(ejs0;h1)uh(y(1 ¡ ¿);h1) + ¼(ujs0;h1)uh(yµ;h1)gabm
b¡1
0 = 0
Take the ¯rst order condition of F with respect to h0, m0 and s0 respectively ¯rst and




@s0 can be determined:
@F
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Since the signs of the ¯rst order condition of F with respect to h0, m0 and s0 respectively
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[u(y(1 ¡ ¿);h1) ¡ u(yµ;h1)]
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(1 + ex)2[u(y(1 ¡ ¿);h1) ¡ u(yµ;h1)] +
¼(ejs0;h1)uh(y(1 ¡ ¿);h1) + ¼(ujs0;h1)uh(yµ;h1)g(1 ¡ ±)Á0 > 0
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Table 4. Estimation results of OLS estimation (medical expenditure
share to income as medical expenditure):














*the coe±cient is not signi¯cant at 5 percent signi¯cant level.
Table 4. Estimation results of OLS estimation (medical expenditure
share to income as medical expenditure)(continued):













No of observations 8168**
**See footnote 8.
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